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Abstract. The most common anomaly detection mechanisms at application level
consist in detecting a deviation of the control-flow of a program. A popular
method to detect such anomaly is the use of application sequences of system
calls. However, such methods do not detect mimicry attacks or attacks against the
integrity of the system call parameters. To enhance such detection mechanisms,
we propose an approach to detect in the application the corruption of data items
that have an influence on the system calls. This approach consists in building au-
tomatically a data-oriented behaviour model of an application by static analysis
of its source code. The proposed approach is illustrated on various examples, and
an injection method is experimented to obtain an approximation of the detection
coverage of the generated mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Generally speaking, an attack against an application consists in exploiting a vulnera-
bility in order to violate the confidentiality or integrity properties of the system or the
application under attack. In the context of intrusion detection methods at application
level, a lot of existing work focuses on the detection of the violation of the integrity
property. Attacks against a process can consist in corrupting either the control-flow
of the program (e.g., to execute injected code), or the data items manipulated by the
program during its execution. A lot of papers focus on the detection of the program
control-flow corruption, either considering the process as a white box, or seeing it as a
black box. An exemple of a white box approach is to verify during the execution that
the control-flow graph of the program is legal. An example of the black box approach
consists in verifying that the trace of the process execution in the system is correct (e.g.,
the sequence of system calls [1]). Both approaches can be subject to false negatives, as
the attacker can either corrupt data items that do not influence the control-flow of the
program, or perform attacks that mimic [2] the normal behaviour of the application.
Various papers [3,4,5,6] have enhanced the black box approach in order to detect these
types of refined attacks.
In this paper, we propose a white box approach for intrusion detection that aims at
detecting the corruption of the data items in an application, so as to detect erroneous
system calls (e.g., their arguments are not correct, or the data that led to their execution
were incorrect). The approach relies on the building of a data-oriented behaviour model.
This method can be presented as an interesting complement to the usual control-flow
corruption detection method, in order to detect data oriented attacks. To attain this goal
we use static analysis to build constraints on intrusion sensitive data items, then we
instrument the software with executable assertions that check these constraints during
the execution of the program.
The contribution of this paper is not to provide new static analysis techniques, as our
work relies on an off-the-shelf static analyser called Frama-C [7]. However, we want
to show on real-life examples that a detection model can be built by static analysis and
detect data attacks (even unknown ones).
The paper is organized in the following way: after a short related work section on
white-box attack detection, we show how to build the behaviour model and emphasize
the accuracy of the model on a previously known attack. Then we show the results of the
software instrumentation on various examples. At the end we evaluate on an example
the detection rate we can expect from the generated detection mechanisms.
2 Related Work
We believe that white box mechanisms can help improving the detection performance
as they are able to take advantage of the internal state of the monitored program. Indeed,
they have access to all the internal data structures and algorithms used by the program.
That is the case, for example, with Control-Flow Integrity [8] and Program Shep-
herding [9]. These generic techniques verify the integrity of the control-flow of a pro-
gram. A control-flow graph of the program is computed prior to its execution and then
used at run time to check the integrity of the process control-flow. Because mimicry at-
tacks still need to force the program control-flow to deviate from valid execution paths,
they are caught by these approaches. However, unlike our approach, all those techniques
are completely ineffective against computation data attacks (also called non-control data
attacks [10]), since these attacks are performed using a valid execution path.
Other white box approaches that focus on non-control-data attacks and that do not
exhibit this weakness have been proposed. For example, Write-Integrity Testing [11]
enforces control-flow and data-flow integrity in a program. In the work on Data Flow
Integrity [12], a data-flow graph is computed prior to the execution. It contains, for each
data item read by an instruction, the set of instructions that may have written its current
value. This data-flow graph is then used at run time to verify the integrity of the data
flow of the process. If the program has a vulnerability that is exploited to corrupt some
data, the next time this data is read a deviation from the data-flow graph will be ob-
served allowing thus the detection of the attack. This type of approach is very effective
against all kinds of non-control-data attacks, but use a very different philosophy than
our approach. They focus on the illegal modification of the data, whereas in our ap-
proach we focus on the correctness of the data. As a consequence some attacks missed
by the data-flow integrity method (such as an illegal value stored in a correct variable)
can be detected by our approach. Conversely some illegal writes can be missed by our
approach (a legal value can be written in an incorrect variable), making both approaches
complementary.
3 Intrusion Detection
In this section, we explain how non-control-data attacks are real threats and how a
data-oriented behavior model can detect them. We also present SIDAN 3 (Software In-
strumentation for the Detection of Attacks on Non-control-data) [13], a tool we have
developed that implements our detection model.
3.1 An attack against non-control-data
00. int main(int argc, char ** argv){
01. char buffer[256];
02. uid_t uid = 5;
03.
04.
05. seteuid(uid);
06.
07. while(aux = fgets(buffer, 256, stdin))
08. {
09. seteuid(0);
10. printf(buffer);
11.
12. seteuid(uid);
13. }
14. }
00. int main(int argc, char ** argv){
01. char buffer[256];
02. uid_t uid = 5;
03.
04. assert(uid == 5);
05. seteuid(uid);
06.
07. while(aux = fgets(buffer, 256, stdin))
08. {
09. seteuid(0);
10. printf(buffer);
11. assert(uid == 5);
12. seteuid(uid);
13. }
14. }
Fig. 1. Example of string format vulnerability and useful assertions
Chen et al. [10] have demonstrated that non-control data attacks can be as severe as
control-data attacks on various real world vulnerabilities. Among them, a vulnerability
found in the implementation of the open source ftp server wu_ftpd will serve as an
example to illustrate our approach. Figure 1 (left column) is an excerpt of the original
code exhibiting the same vulnerability. Line 10, a string taken as user input (line 7) is
printed without using a string format. Consequently, a user can forge an incorrect buffer
containing string formats that allows to write directly in memory. In this case, the target
could be the uid variable. As a consequence, the attacker can elevate its privilege at
line 12, without corrupting the execution path, by forcing the parameter of the seteuid
call to be the administrator identifier (zero). This example shows how such an attack
violates a very simple constraint on the uid variable. Indeed, the uid variable should
remain constant during the execution of the loop (lines 7 to 13) and should be equal to
the value it has been assigned at uid (line 2). The problem we tackle in this paper is to
automatically build such constraints in order to detect attacks at runtime.
3.2 Data oriented detection Model
In our approach, we consider that an attacker aims at modifying data items in the mem-
ory space of a process in order to execute one or more incorrect system calls. This
objective can be fulfilled in two ways: either the attacker alters variables that influence
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the internal control-flow of the program (and thus executes system calls in an incorrect
context), or the attacker modifies directly or indirectly the values of the parameters of
one or more system calls (and thus executes legal system calls with incorrect values).
Both types of attacks aims at modifying non-control data items in the program. Note
here that non-control data items are all variables used by the program source code, and
can thus have an impact on the control-flow of the application. They are opposed to
control-data items that are used by the system (and not the application) to control the
execution flow of the application (e.g., a return adress on the stack).
In order to detect these modifications, we propose to identify the set of constraints
that should be verified at runtime for these items. Generally speaking, these constraints
can be divided in two classes: the variation domain of the variables (e.g., a variable can
take a restricted set of values), and the relationship between the variation domains of the
variables (i.e., when a variable has particular values, other variables take a defined set of
values). If we only check if a variable is within its variation domain, it may be easy for
an attacker to impose a reasonable value that would fit in the variation domain, but that
is incorrect in the context of the program. Clearly, if we can maintain the relationship
with other variables, it will be more difficult for an attacker to modify simultaneously
several variables that depend on each other while keeping the program in a consistent
state. As a consequence, we propose to define a data behaviour model for intrusion
detection that aims at taking into account these requirements.
Formally, we define for a given system call SCi its data behavior model by a triple
(SCi,Vi,Ci) where Vi is the set of variables the system call depends on, and Ci the set
of constraints on these variables that can be deduced from the program analysis. We
can define the normal data behavior model of the program by the set of all triples,
DBM = {∀i,(SCi,Vi,Ci)}. In the following section, we address the two problems faced
to build this model: how to determine the set of variables a system call depends on, and
how to obtain the constraints that must be verified on these variables at runtime.
Building the set of variables Building Vi requires the ability to determine in the pro-
gram which are the variables that influence the execution of the particular system call
SCi. Generally speaking, a system call can depend on a variable in two different ways:
a variable either has an influence on the path in the program that leads to the execu-
tion of SCi or influences the parameters of SCi. These sets of variables can be built by
using a static analysis technique called program slicing [14]. A program slice can be
defined as the parts of a program that potentially affect the values computed at some
point of interest of this program. In our case, we are looking for all the variables that
influence a system call, and thus all variables that are in the program slice whose point
of interest is the system call itself. In the static analysis field, the computation of a
program slice is generally based on the computation of a program dependency graph
(PDG) [15]. The PDG is a directed graph whose vertices correspond to statements and
control predicates, and edges correspond to data and control dependencies. This graph
can be used to exhibit the set of variables a particular system call depends on, and the
type of dependency. In our implementation, we directly use the PDG notion to discover
in the program all variables a system call depends on. To illustrate this paragraph, we
can consider the example on Figure 1: the seteuid call at line 5 depends on one vari-
able: uid. However, the seteuid call at line 12 depends indirectly on the aux variable and
directly on the uid variable.
Constraint discovery Automatically discovering constraints in the source code on the
variables that are defined in the previous paragraph requires to use static analysis tech-
niques. We could imagine any types of constraints, including for example temporal con-
straints. In practice, static analysis techniques often compute constant constraints, also
called invariants. Indeed, any static analysis technique that is able to compute invariants
from the source code fits our needs. Moreover, a popular technique for calculating such
invariants is the abstract interpretation method [16]. In practice, abstract interpretation
provides a way to find properties on the variables of a program by computing abstract
domains that represent abstractions of the real properties of the program. Several mod-
els have been developed to discover such invariants. Among them, we have chosen
to focus on the build of numerical abstract domains, i.e., we intend to find numerical
invariants. These types of domains can be classified in two groups: non-relational do-
mains that find numerical properties on variables individually, and relational domains
that permit to find numerical properties on logically linked variables. Non-relational
domains include for example the interval domain [16] (wich permits to find invariants
of the form vi ∈ [c1,c2]where vi is a variable of the program and c1 and c2 are numerical
constants), the constant propagation domain (vi = c) and the congruence domain [17]
(vi ∈ aZ+ b). Example of relational domains can be cited such as the polyhedron do-
main [18] (α1v1+ ...+αnvn ≤ c), the linear equality domain [19] (α1v1+ ...+αnvn = c)
and the linear congruence equality domain [20] (α1v1 + ...+ αnvn ≡ a[b]). The prob-
lem with relational domains is that the algorithms they use usually do not scale on
large programs. That is why Frama-C uses computational methods that are based on
non-relational domains.
00: extern int a, b;
01: void f(int);
03: void g(){
04: if (b == 0) a = 1;
05: else if(b == 1) a = 2;
06: else return;
09: f(a);
10: }
00: extern int a, b;
01: void f(int);
03: void g(){
04: if (b == 0) a = 1;
05: else if(b == 1) a = 2;
06: else return;
08: assert((a == 1 && b == 0) || (a == 2 && b == 1))
09: f(a);
10: }
Fig. 2. C code sample that emphasises relations between variables
SIDAN Plugin in the Frama-C framework We implemented in SIDAN the computa-
tion of numerical constraints for a given system call. Frama-C provides a Value Analysis
plugin that is able to provide a computation of the variation domains of the variables
that influence the function calls. This plugin provides constraints of the type "integer
variable x lies within the domain [0,5] in all executions" as a result. If we consider
the example Figure 2, the assertion generated for the call to the function f , using the
Value Analysis plugin of Frama-C alone would be a ∈ {1,2} and b ∈ {0,1}. Indeed, as
the Value Analysis plugin uses a non-relational abstract domain, his result misses the
relation between the variables a and b.
If we consider the program Figure 2, we see that when b == 0 then a == 1, and
when b == 1 then a == 2. Actually, to obtain this result we have to consider that there
are two paths leading to the call to the function f , and that the constraint to verify at
the call to f should take these two paths into account. The Value Analysis plug-in uses
an algorithm that can potentially keep in memory several invariants computation on
several execution paths. The plug-in can be parametrized to define the number of paths
explored in parallel by the Value Analysis plug-in, which is related to the number of
states it keeps in memory before computing an union. If the number of paths explored
in parallel is sufficient, the Value Analysis plug-in now has internally the information
required to build these kinds of constraints. By using a hook in the Value Analysis plug-
in, it is possible for our plug-in to access this internal information while the analysis is
performed. Thus, it allows us to build the invariant by using the variation domain of all
the variables on each path. In the example we have described, the invariant generated
for line 08 is (((b == 0)∧ (a == 1))∨ ((b == 1)∧ (a == 2))).
Note that the example we give here focuses on invariants computed for integers.
In practice, the Value Analysis plug-in performs well on integers and floats, but is not
very efficient for pointer analysis (at best, it detects access to an unallocated buffer
and some out-of-bound access). Discovering constraints on strings is also unavailable
due to the fact that the specification of the standard string functions is not included
in Frama-C. In order to build some constraints on strings, we have preprocessed the
source code to replace standard string comparisons by a set of character comparisons
whenever possible (see Figure 3 line 3). As a result, some constraints on string buffers
have been obtained in the programs we tested our approach on.
3.3 Generated assertions
In order to verify the constraints in the program, we insert executable assertions (see
Figure 2 line 08), which is a technique heavily used in the dependability domain, and
more precisely in defensive programming [21,22].
The constraints that we can compute for a given system call deal with the variables
that are available locally in the context of the system call. However, this call generally
depends not only on the local variables but also on the variables manipulated by pre-
vious functions in the call stack. That is why it is necessary to compute invariants for
all function calls that are on the path that leads to the system call. This implies that we
must distribute the executable assertions on all the paths that lead to system calls. More-
over, some system calls can be performed in functions located in external libraries. As
a consequence, we choose to insert executable assertions in front of each function call.
To demonstrate the assertion generation capabilities of our data-oriented detection
model, we first use as an example a vulnerable version of OpenSSH.
The code in Figure 3 is inspired by this vulnerable version of OpenSSH and repro-
duces the basic structure of the real code. The vulnerability is located in the packet_read
function and can be used to overwrite the value of the passwd variable with an empty
00: void do_authentication(){
01: int auth = 0;
...
03: if(!strcmp(pwd, ""))
/* for users with no password */
05: else
/* do_authloop(); */
07: while(auth != 1) {
08: type = packet_read(data);
09: switch (type) {
10: case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
11.
12: auth = auth_password(pwd, data);
13: break;
14: ...
15: }
16: }
17: do_authenticated(user);
18: }
00: void do_authentication(){
01: int auth = 0;
...
03: if(pwd[0] != ’\0’)
/* for users with no password */
05: else
/* do_authloop(); */
07: while(auth != 1) {
08: type = packet_read(data);
09: switch (type) {
10: case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
11: assert(pwd[0] != ’\0’);
12: auth = auth_password(pwd, data);
13: break;
...
15: }
16: }
17: do_authenticated(user);
18: }
Fig. 3. Example inspired from OpenSSH
OpenSSH DropbearSSH ihttpd fnord ssmtp
Number of lines 38000 11000 1043 2303 2976
Number of assertions 291 91 145 41 240
Computation time 6 hours 3 hours 45 minutes 1 minute 17 seconds 5 hours 22 minutes
Table 1. Assertions generated
string during the execution of do_authloop. This allows a successful authentication on
the system with any known account (e.g., root) and without having to provide a valid
password.
Among the assertions generated, the one located at line 11 in the example in Figure 3
has been produced by our plug-in and detects this attack against the program state.
In order to figure out the capability of our tool to generate assertions on common
programs, we have applied it on SSH servers (OpenSSH and Dropbear SSH), http
servers (fnord and ihttpd), and a smtp server (ssmtp). The results are summarized in
Table 1. As a result, we could say that the number of assertions generated is obviously
heavily dependant on the program source code.
4 Assessment of the detection mechanisms
Even though it is possible to test our detection mechanism against various real world
attacks such as those described in [10], such a method would only cover a very small
subset of all possible attacks. In order to evaluate the detection coverage of our ap-
proach, we would need to know all the vulnerabilities that afflict a program as well as
every possible way of exploiting them. As it is not possible to automatically compute
this from the source code, we need to define another method to evaluate the detection
coverage of our model. In this section we propose a method to assess the detection
mechanisms by simulating attacks against non-control-data items without prior knowl-
edge of the vulnerabilities. Our goal is to simulate the consequences of non-control-data
attacks by directly modifying in the process memory space the data items it is currently
manipulating. In this section, we propose an approach to evaluate our detection mech-
anism that is similar to the ones proposed in the security field to help discover new
vulnerabilities (fuzzing) and in the dependability field to evaluate fault detection and
tolerance mechanisms (fault injection).
4.1 Simulation of attacks against non-control data
Generally speaking, a particular vulnerability usually allows the attacker to access a
limited part of a process memory. However, in the worst case scenario it can give to an
attacker an access to the whole memory space of a process. For that reason, our injection
mechanism is given access to potentially every internal data item of the program under
test. However, to accurately simulate a real non-control-data attack, we want to restrict
(1) the locations and (2) the instants where an injection can occur during the execution
of a program. Firstly, during such an attack not every data item is a potential target. The
data items that may be of interest for an attacker are within the subset of data items that
can influence the execution of the system calls. Consequently, we target only these data
items (they define the locations of potential injections). Other data items are irrelevant
for our simulation approach. Secondly, we will modify such items only when they are
currently in use (i.e., when they are influencing the current execution of the program).
4.2 Code instrumentation and fault injection
To simulate this injection model, two problems have to be addressed: how do we de-
termine the set of data items that are potential targets for a non-control-data attack, and
how do we determine for each one of them when it is appropriate to inject a corrupted
value. Clearly, the set of data we want to modify is the very same set of data items we
have defined in Section 3.2.
The simplest way to determine the memory address of a variable we want to inject
is to obtain it at execution time. This is why we have choosen to also embed the cor-
rupting mechanisms within the source code. Moreover we have decided to distribute the
injection mechanisms when the corresponding variables are reachable, that is right be-
fore every function call that depends on them. We used the same approach as described
in Section 3.3 where we discussed the distribution of the detection mechanisms. In the
end, each candidate function call is preceded by a call to the corrupting function imple-
mented by a single external function called inject().
Each injection point is assigned a unique identifier. This identifier is passed as a pa-
rameter to the injection function. The remaining arguments are the number of variables
that can be corrupted and for each one of them, its address and its size. The corrupting
function is controlled by an external process using environment variables. This process
controls the unique identifier of the injection that is to be activated, the variable that
will be corrupted and the value used to perform the injection. An injection is triggered
only once, even when the call to the corrupting function happens many times (e.g., in
a loop). The tool presented in Section 3 has been modified in order to perform the in-
strumentation needed by our injection mechanism. Note that the set of variables A used
in an assertion is always a subset of the set of variables I used in the injection process
(see Figure 4). Indeed, the injection can be performed in any variable that influences
extern int a;
const int b = 1;
if (a == 0) {
inject(0,2,&a,sizeof(a),&b,sizeof(b));
assert(b == 1 && a == 0);
f(b);
}
A≡ I
extern int a;
extern int b;
if (a) {
inject(0,2,&a,sizeof(a),&b,sizeof(b));
assert(a != 0);
f(b);
}
A⊂ I
extern int a;
extern int b;
if (a == b) {
inject(0,2,&a,sizeof(a),&b,sizeof(b));
f(b);
}
A≡ /0
Fig. 4. Different cases of injections and assertions
the function call, unlike the assertions that only concern variables for which value con-
straints have been discovered.
Our goal is to evaluate our detection mechanism presented in Section 3. To do that,
we need to cover a large set of memory corruptions that might be used by a malicious
user to perform an intrusion. Very much like a fuzzing technique, we are going to ran-
domly put the internal state of the process in an erroneous state. We perform various
injections during the execution of the program used in our test environment in order to
simulate the result of a vulnerability exploitation.
To activate a maximum of function calls in the program, we have written a set of
scenarios whose goal is to make the control-flow pass through a maximum number of
function calls. In the case of Dropbear SSH, we have written a set of 24 scenarios that
allows us to reach 92% of the function calls.
During the injection process, for each function call that can be reached by a scenario,
a random variable from the set of variables that influences the execution of this function
call is chosen to be injected with a random value. Each time an attack is simulated, the
controller logs if the scenario ended properly or if the process exited unexpectedly or
found itself in a deadlock and needed to be killed after a time-out. The controller also
logs the behavior of the process during the attack (in terms of system calls and their
arguments). The whole test setup is shown in Figure 5.
4.3 Evaluation results
Using the experimentation protocol described in Section 4.2, we have performed a to-
tal of 120 000 injections on the Dropbear SSH server. As explained before for each
injection, we have logged three kinds of information. Firstly, we have compared the
output generated by the server during the injection with respect to the output generated
without injection. These observations can be considered as an extremely accurate indi-
cator of a potential attack. Indeed, in these cases, the modification of a single variable
has been able to modify the execution of the SSH server upto the point its external be-
haviour (as seen by an SSH client) was changed. Note that 69.36% of the injections
have lead to such an alert (either a deviation of output, or a crash of the server). Of
course, while being an extremely accurate way of detecting intrusions, this approach is
difficult to generalize in real life settings, since it would require to compare the output
produced by the server for each command it receives with a reference output. Con-
sidering the generally extremely large set of outputs such a server can produce, this
Logs
Controller
Process
SynchronisationInjection
Random injection function
Random variable
Random value
End of scenario
End of process
Time-out
Scenarios Logs
Execution
System calls
alerts
SIDAN
alerts
Logs
process outputs
Fig. 5. Experimentation protocol
SIDAN alert Unexpected server exit Incorrect server output Strace alert
Injection detected 74827 21574 61470 26970
Detection rate 62.36% 18.13% 51.23% 22.48%
Table 2. Injection results on Dropbear SSH
approach is hopeless. Here we were able to use such an approach because of the limited
set of scenarios we have used during the assessment. Secondly, we also recorded the
set of system calls (with their arguments) that were generated during normal executions
of the different scenarios (training), and during injections. These recordings have been
submitted afterward to an offline intrusion detection mechanism [3]. Once again, this
IDS was settled in optimum conditions, since it was trained for a given scenario. And
even in these optimal conditions, note that it only detects 22.48% of injections.
Finally we have recorded the alerts generated by our SIDAN tool. The results of
all these measures are summarized in Table 2. A more detailed version of the obtained
results is given by the Figure 6. We can see that SIDAN detects 62.36 % of the injec-
tions. This detection rate is comparable to the one obtained by the first IDS based on
the comparison of the output generated by the server (but recall here, that we claim that
this kind of IDS is extremely difficult to build in real settings). However, SIDAN is still
prone to false negatives with at most 37.64% of injections missed. We can refine these
figures by taking into account the fact that within these 37.64% of cases where SIDAN
raised no alert, 10.63% where cases where : (1) neither the output generated by the SSH
server deviated from the reference output. (2) nor the system call trace deviated from
the reference trace. We can be highly confident that these cases do not correspond to
exploitable attacks. Hence we can subtract these 10.63% from the figures obtained for
false negatives for SIDAN. All in all, we can claim that the rate of false negatives for
SIDAN lies within a 27.01% and 37.64%.
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Fig. 6. Distribution of alerts
5 Conclusion and future work
In this article, we propose a sofware-level intrusion detection approach based on the
internal state of the process that detects data attacks, which are missed by traditional
control-flow approaches. Our mechanism relies on a data-oriented behavior model to
detect erroneous states that could lead to illegal system calls. We present a tool that
implements our approach by analyzing and instrumenting a program’s source code.
This tool has proved that our approach is useable in the context of real software and
that it can detect real world non-control-data attacks (such as the null password attack
on OpenSSH). We also propose a method to assess these intrusion detection systems
against data attacks by using a fault injection mechanism. In the particular case of Drop-
bear SSH, by using our evaluation method, we have estimated, without prior knowledge
of any attacks, an approximation of the detection coverage of our detection model.
However, the current implementation of our tool computes the constraints needed by
our detection model using only variation domains. This is clearly a limitation, because
it does not permit the detection of data attacks on variables whose variation domain
is statically unknown in the source code. That is why in the future we intend to use
additional static analysis techniques to discover more constraints. We also plan to in-
vestigate for our evaluation method the possibility of replacing the set of hand written
scenarios by automatically generated scenarios using fuzzing techniques [23].
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